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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3473 
_____________ 
 
ROBERT EISENBERRY 
 
v. 
 
SHAW BROTHERS; SHAW BROTHERS DONKEY BALL; 
TIMOTHY SHAW, d/b/a Shaw Brothers Donkey Ball Co.; 
KIM M. SKERPON 
 
Kim M. Skerpon, 
Appellant 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 08-cv-01337 
U.S. Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion 
___________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 24, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 30, 2011) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge 
 On September 4, 2007, Robert Eisenberry fell from a hayloft in a barn and 
sustained a spinal cord injury that left him a paraplegic.  At the time of Eisenberry’s 
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injury, Kim M. Skerpon, who owned the barn, had leased it to Timothy Shaw and Shaw 
Brothers Donkey Ball Company (collectively “Shaw Brothers”).  Thereafter Eisenberry 
sued Skerpon and Shaw Brothers, alleging that they had been negligent and that they 
were liable for his injuries.  Both Skerpon and the Shaw Brothers unsuccessfully moved 
for summary judgment on liability.  A jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of 
Eisenberry.
1
  The District Court denied Skerpon’s post-trial motion pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for judgment as a matter of law.  This timely appeal 
followed.
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Skerpon argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion for summary 
judgment and her Rule 50 motion.  Because the case proceeded to trial, “our review is 
limited to the District Court’s denial of the . . . Rule 50 motion.”  Hopp v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 439 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999).  We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s ruling on a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Johnson v. 
Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003).  “In doing so, however, the court must draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility 
determinations or weigh the evidence.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 150 (2000).   
                                              
1
   The parties consented to having United States Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion 
conduct all pretrial and trial proceedings as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
 
2
   The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Although 
the trial was limited to the issue of liability, we have final order jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 because the parties stipulated to the total amount of damages prior to trial. 
3 
 
Skerpon contends that the District Court erred in denying her motion for judgment 
as a matter of law because the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) that she owed a 
duty to the plaintiff as an out-of-possession landlord, and (2) that a breach of this duty 
caused Eisenberry’s injury.  Skerpon focuses on her testimony concerning her obligations 
under the lease to support her assertion that she did not owe a duty.  We cannot ignore, 
however, that Timothy Shaw also testified concerning his obligations under the lease and 
that his testimony conflicted with Skerpon’s in several respects.  After considering all of 
the evidence adduced at trial, and without “mak[ing] credibility determinations or 
weigh[ing] the evidence,” id., we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to 
conclude that Skerpon, despite her status as an out-of-possession landlord, owed a duty to 
Eisenberry.  See Dinio v. Goshorn, 270 A.2d 203, 206 (Pa. 1969); Dorsey v. Cont’l 
Assoc., 591 A.2d 716, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  Furthermore, we conclude that there 
was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that a breach of this duty caused Eisenberry’s 
injury.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
